

## **Section C: Regional, State, and Local Cooperation**

### ***Introduction***

The overall success of national enforcement efforts to combat the availability and use of illegal drugs in the United States depends in great measure on the effectiveness of state and local law enforcement efforts. The decentralized nature of law enforcement makes it difficult to implement a comprehensive counterdrug intelligence system. Federal drug law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the input and participation of state and local organizations in task forces and multiagency investigations. The challenge is to leverage resources and existing Federal, state, and local cooperative mechanisms such as Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task forces, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the High-Risk Money-Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs), and others, to maximize interagency and intercommunity effectiveness.

Some 17,000 Federal, regional, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and support entities exist. Often agencies operate autonomously, frequently with overlapping jurisdictions, and are supported by multiple authorities, procedures, and systems. Drug investigators increasingly have joined together in local or regional task force programs for coordination and support. Multicomponent task forces and HIDTAs, in particular, have multiplied. All serve to advance local or regional cooperation, but require enhanced national and multiregional coordination. This expanded coordination will improve operational effectiveness and help reduce jurisdictional and funding competitiveness.

The regional or local intelligence centers associated with many of these programs are intended to be strongly tactical, augmenting the development of individual cases. However, they do not routinely generate meaningful systematic trend and pattern analyses which would be useful for investigations conducted on a national or international scale.

A typical, large U.S. metropolitan area has the DEA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, state, county, and city police forces, and Federal, state, city, and county prosecutors carrying out drug investigations, interdictions, and prosecutions in support of their respective missions and jurisdictions. Many have their own intelligence capabilities, and many participate in joint task forces. Information is shared among agencies predominately through interpersonal communication, on a case-by-case basis. Accommodating the complexity of U.S. law enforcement, in terms of the number of agencies and agent-level information-sharing practices, is a central challenge of a common counterdrug intelligence-sharing system.

This section of the GCIP presents 13 action items to further enhance regional, state, and local cooperative efforts.

**C-1. Consolidation of Drug Intelligence Resources:** In major metropolitan areas, Federal law enforcement agencies and the HIDTA Intelligence Centers, where they exist, will take steps to consolidate, or at least collocate, core drug intelligence-gathering and -reporting components, including information systems terminal access. Agencies will retain, as they consider appropriate, their own intelligence units to serve their individual requirements. Such units should endeavor to coordinate efforts and share information with other drug intelligence organizations in their region. In geographic areas identified by the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG), participating agencies, with the support of the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX), will review the feasibility and efficacy of consolidating or collocating the drug intelligence functions of the various agencies.

**C-2. Dedication of Intelligence Analysts to Produce Sanitized Reports:** Law enforcement information sharing can be markedly and actively enhanced by establishing a capability to generate and disseminate sanitized reports of current law enforcement investigative information to their counterpart law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. Doing so necessitates the dedication of a cadre of intelligence analysts in the Federal law enforcement agencies, especially DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs Service headquarters and field offices. Their primary mission is to ensure that timely and high-value, but not case-sensitive, information is provided to those with a need-to-know, while protecting sensitive, undercover, and legally-restricted law enforcement sources, information, individuals, and techniques. The law enforcement community needs a reporting capability comparable to the Intelligence Community's reports officer to "push out" valuable information from the law enforcement field offices to their own headquarters elements. This information would be further disseminated to the drug intelligence community, as appropriate, to augment their analyses and focus collection tasking. Law enforcement should not generate these reports at the expense of direct case support. FY 2000 resource levels are not programmed to accommodate these initiatives. (See Action Item E-18 for training implications.)

**C-3. Federal Participation in HIDTA Intelligence Centers:** The mission of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program is to enhance and coordinate America's drug-control efforts among Federal, state, and local agencies in order to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking (including the production, manufacture, transportation, distribution, and chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering) and its harmful consequences in critical areas of the United States.

The establishment of intelligence centers in each HIDTA is a recent Federally funded, yet locally implemented, intelligence initiative. The participation of Federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies in these centers will provide a local forum for interagency information gathering and exchange. HIDTA Intelligence Centers must be fully integrated into the local counterdrug law enforcement information architecture. Federal agencies should participate actively in each HIDTA and its Intelligence Center.

**C-4. Development of Guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence Centers:** The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), in coordination with the CDX and Federal, state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will develop comprehensive intelligence-related policies and guidelines for HIDTA Intelligence Centers.

**C-5. Establishment of Core Functions and Services for HIDTA Intelligence Centers:** HIDTA Intelligence Centers differ in their level of development, due largely to regional needs and local HIDTA Executive Committee decisions. To a lesser degree, the Centers vary because of limited national oversight and guidance provided to the HIDTAs. As the HIDTA Program continues to develop, ONDCP will provide program guidance for a set of core services and functions for HIDTA Intelligence Centers:

- (1) The mission of the HIDTA Intelligence Centers is to facilitate the timely exchange of information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies participating in the HIDTA area of responsibility. In part, this will be accomplished by encouraging automated database access to, and initiating automated systems messaging connectivity among, Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement national centers and their enforcement databases, to include the Global Justice Information Network (Global);
- (2) Establish event and case deconfliction systems using commercial or government off-the-shelf technology where the systems do not already exist;
- (3) Develop drug threat assessments for HIDTA areas of responsibility (see Action Item C-12, below);
- (4) Conduct post-seizure analysis<sup>9</sup> of major seizures related to HIDTA initiatives;
- (5) Assist participating state and local enforcement agencies in reporting drug seizures to EPIC for inclusion in the database supporting the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System;
- (6) Participate in on-line intelligence reporting systems that can be used on a state, regional, or national basis; and,
- (7) Provide a photo-imaging network capability that would permit Federal, state, and local jurisdictions to share arrest photographs and biographic data for arrestees in the area. These efforts should comport with the National Crime Information Center 2000 and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System planned to provide digital photo imaging capability.

**C-6. Expansion of Document Exploitation (DOCEX) Capabilities:** ONDCP will support the establishment of six initial DOCEX teams at designated regional intelligence centers. ONDCP—in coordination with the various HIDTA Executive Committees, and

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<sup>9</sup>Post-seizure analysis would include immediate exploitation of data as well as follow-up exploitation for intelligence purposes and comprehensive dissemination of analysis results.

in consultation with the CDICG—will select six HIDTA Intelligence Centers to establish a document exploitation capability. FY 2000 resources are not programmed for this new initiative. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) document exploitation and computer forensics specialists—in conjunction with the Justice Training Center—will help train these DOCEX analysts. NDIC, as reflected in Action Item B-7, will continue to provide priority DOCEX support services until these designated elements are capable of serving their regions. At that time, the CDICG will evaluate the NDIC role as a continuing DOCEX regional or nationwide surge support and training assistance provider. ONDCP, in coordination with NDIC, DEA, FBI, and CDX, will develop protocols for the use of these teams.

**C-7. Management of HIDTA Intelligence Centers:** ONDCP, in coordination with the CDX and the Federal, state, and local agencies participating in the HIDTA Program, will issue guidelines to ensure the HIDTA Intelligence Centers have dual Federal-state/local management with a single line supervisor. The supervisor of the Intelligence Center will be a sworn Federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or a law enforcement intelligence analyst appointed by one of the managing agencies and approved by the HIDTA Executive Committee. The supervisor must have appropriate Federal law enforcement clearances.

**C-8. HIDTA Intelligence Center Information Sharing and Access:** Agencies participating in HIDTA Intelligence Centers will provide Center personnel with on-site, direct access to their agency's pertinent databases, whenever possible and in accordance with existing Federal and state regulations. HIDTA Intelligence Centers are less effective where staff do not have access and connectivity to participating agency-specific data systems such as DEA's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS), FBI's Automated Case Support System (ACS), or the Treasury Enforcement Computer System (TECS). Center personnel should be cross-designated to grant direct access to other participating agencies' databases whenever possible. If direct access by Center personnel to participating agencies' databases is not possible, dedicated personnel will be assigned to the Intelligence Center from the participating agency to ensure access to its information.

**C-9. Funding of Background Investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center Employees:** ONDCP and the individual HIDTAs will budget for the requisite background investigations for HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel. The lack of background investigations for some HIDTA Intelligence Center employees has sometimes prevented access to available information. The Federal agency jointly managing the HIDTA Intelligence Center will be responsible for arranging for background investigations for non-Federal Center personnel. Granting Federal law enforcement clearances to HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel satisfies one prerequisite for access to law enforcement databases, because the clearances granted by one agency are recognized by the other agencies. The standards for granting clearances will not be lowered.

**C-10. Eligibility of HIDTA Intelligence Center Personnel to Receive Law**

**Enforcement Information:** EPIC will work with the individual states to revise its Memoranda of Understanding to designate HIDTA Intelligence Center authorized personnel as eligible to make inquiries to EPIC and receive law enforcement information, provided that they satisfy the management guidelines of Action Item C-7, and have appropriate background investigations per Action Item C-9. Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Assistance will revise its guidelines to designate HIDTA Intelligence Centers as eligible to join RISSes, have target input capability, and receive law enforcement information.

**C-11. Production of Regional Threat Assessments:** Coordinated threat assessments that aggregate and analyze intelligence on the drug problem within specific regions, Federal jurisdictions, metropolitan areas, and cities are needed—and in many instances are produced—by authorities at all levels. Examples include DEA annual and quarterly drug threat and trend reports, Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) regional drug threat assessments, and HIDTA area drug threat assessments. NDIC will produce the annual, domestic National Drug Threat Assessment by combining and analyzing all information provided by Federal, state, and local law enforcement, HIDTAs, and other sources. NDIC will also produce complementary drug threat assessments for geographic regions.

**C-12. Production of HIDTA Area Drug Threat Assessments:** HIDTA Intelligence Centers will produce consolidated and coordinated annual interagency drug threat assessments for their areas. In addition to drawing upon Federal, state, and local law enforcement and other sources within their areas, these HIDTA assessments will draw upon the district crime and drug assessments prepared by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and regional drug threat assessments prepared by the OCDETF Regional Advisory Councils. Copies of these threat assessments will be provided to NDIC. To ensure the appropriate scope and depth of HIDTA threat assessments, ONDCP, with input from NDIC, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the OCDETF program of the Department of Justice, and others, will develop the format for the HIDTA area threat assessments.

**C-13. Participation of Federal Agencies in the National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) System:** NDPIX is a fully automated pointer system developed by state and local law enforcement, in conjunction with the DEA. NDPIX serves as a valuable investigative coordination and criminal subject deconfliction mechanism and is accessible through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Federal agencies, to include FBI, DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Marshals Service, will plan full participation in NDPIX within two years. NDPIX will be used in support of case/subject deconfliction. NDPIX is a powerful investigative tool that will provide participating state, local, and Federal law enforcement personnel with pointer information relative to active drug targets.