Introduction

Cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) is the final product derived from the leaves of the coca plant, commonly grown along the Andean Ridge in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. The leaves of the plant, which are harvested approximately four times a year, must be dried in order to enter the initial processing stage within seven days or they will be vulnerable to spoilage and a decline in alkalinity. The production of cocaine is a two-stage process performed at separate facilities, beginning with the conversion to cocaine base and ending with the production of HCl. Because of the leaf's shelf life, most cocaine base laboratories are either co-located or within a short distance of the cultivation areas. Because the processing of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride requires a large amount of water and precursor chemicals, most laboratories are located adjacent to—or within one kilometer of—a waterway. In addition to the ready water supply, the waterway facilitates the delivery of precursor chemicals, which are normally transported in 30–55 gallon containers/drums. (Moving such drums through dense forestation is impossible) Cocaine base has a shelf life of approximately 30 days and can be moved great distances before being processed into HCl. Once processed into cocaine HCl, it degrades at a rate of less than 1 percent a year.

Andean Production

Bolivia

In 1996 the government of Bolivia, in concert with the national police and the military, mounted an aggressive program to eradicate illicit coca cultivation by the year 2002. Five successive years of decreases in potential production suggest that Bolivia is well on its way toward achieving that goal. In addition to the eradication program, the government adopted an aggressive precursor chemical program¹⁵. The majority of cocaine HCl produced in Bolivia is transported to Brazil for consumption and further transfer to world markets, primarily Europe. Some Bolivian HCl is transported to Chile, Paraguay and Argentina.

Peru

During the early 1990's Peru was the largest cultivator of coca. Aircraft shipped the majority of the cocaine base to southern Colombia over the common border between the two countries. In 1995 the Peruvian government instituted a shoot-down policy directed against aircraft suspected of trafficking. In that same year the U.S. conducted Operation Laser Strike, an operation designed to detect and deter movements within the air bridge between Peru and Colombia. The combination of the two operations resulted in an extremely depressed coca leaf and cocaine base market in Peru, causing some coca farmers to simply abandon their fields. The market stayed depressed until mid-1998. By then, traffickers moving cocaine base to Colombia had successfully established alternate routes and methods of transportation. Although Colombia does not import as much cocaine base as it did in the early 1990's, most of the base in Peru presumably moves to Colombia. Detected activity in 1999 indicates that HCl labs are located near Peru's eastern border, allowing drug trafficking aircraft to exit the country before encountering law enforcement actions. Additionally, some cocaine base is moved from East of the Andes, processed near the coast, and shipped from Peru through major ports.

Colombia

Colombian traffickers have always dominated the cocaine trade but Colombia has also become a primary cultivator of coca. Throughout the 1990's it was assumed that Colombia was cultivating the poorer yielding variety of cocaine, E. coca var ipadu, and using less efficient processing techniques. However, the U.S. Government began to detect (as early as 1995) that coca farmers in Colombia had started planting the Peruvian strain of coca plant, E. coca coca, an upland variety that is hardier, more plentiful, and has a higher degree of alkalinity.

There continues to be a connection between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the drug trade. The Colombian government is responding to this challenge. Since the 1970s drug traffickers based in Colombia have forged temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas or right wing groups to secure protection for the drug interests. Traffickers have also established and financed their own private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their services to drug traffickers.

The insurgents' location in the eastern lowlands and southern rainforest, the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions, hinders the Colombian government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent to which some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their constituents (coca farmers and drug traffickers). Insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by offering to protect laboratory operations in return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons.

Some FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) units are independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Recent reports indicate that some FARC units in southern Colombia are indeed directly involved in drug trafficking activities, such as controlling the local markets for cocaine base. Insurgent units have assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine as well as protecting clandestine airstrips. No information suggest that FARC or ELN units have established international transportation, wholesale distribution or drug-money laundering networks in the U.S. or Europe.

The primary base of operations for paramilitary groups continues to be northern and central Colombia although recent reports indicate an increase in activity in southern Colombia. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has recently admitted that his group receives payments, similar to the taxes levied by the FARC, from coca growers in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas. His organization—and possibly others—appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine. It is thought that at least one of these groups is involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.

Potential Cocaine Production

Potential cocaine production is calculated by beginning with hectares under coca cultivation and multiplying by the leaf yield, alkaloid content, and base processing efficiency. The calculation measures the amount available for world consumption, assuming all coca hectares are converted to cocaine product. Figure A1 depicts changes in the distribution of Andean potential production. Note that the figure includes two lines for Colombia, the lower one representing earlier Colombian estimates and the higher one representing data as of March 2000.

Source Zone Flow

Detection of cocaine base and HCl movement within South America is very poor. Based on other information such as cultivation areas, suspected laboratory locations, and detected HCl South America to world markets, an assessment of flow begins to emerge.

During the early 1990's the overwhelming majority of cocaine HCl was produced and exported by Colombian traffickers. In the late 1990's traffickers diversified points of departure and began moving cocaine through Venezuela and Ecuador to major ports to be loaded onto maritime vessels. Additionally, some HCl movement has recently been detected moving south into Brazil. This decentralization is attributed, in part, to the need to mask the origin of the vessels involved. Vessels originating in Colombia are more likely to be searched upon arrival in foreign ports than those from Venezuela or Ecuador. Another contributing factor is the expanding European market. Current demand in Europe is estimated at between 69–108 metric tons (Layne, Johnston, and Rhodes 2000), but if seizures are added, the flow rises to 88–150 metric tons. To supply this increasing and lucrative market (the street value for cocaine in Europe is approximately twice that of the U.S.), traffickers are establishing new routes; Colombian traffickers have begun using Venezuela and Ecuador, and are moving to Brazil to get their product to Guyana and Suriname, and Bolivia is moving cocaine through Paraguay and Argentina. This decentralization causes major problems in South America since traffickers do not pay for transportation in local currencies; instead, they pay with a percentage of the shipment generating consumption problems in the transit countries.

Transit Zone

The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) recognizes three corridors of cocaine movement: the Mexico/Central American corridor, the Caribbean corridor, and direct to the Continental U.S. (CONUS). Figure A2 presents the percentage of cocaine shipments that flows through each corridors. Together these corridors constitute 6.5 million square miles or roughly twice the size of the lower 48 U.S. states. Figure A3 presents a perspective on the sheer size of the transit zone.

Moving cocaine through the transit zone to the U.S. is, for the most part, at least a two-stage operation. Maritime vessels account for the majority of primary movement (an estimated 85%), followed by planes (an estimated 15%). The overall flow of cocaine continues to reflect distribution patterns noted over the past several years.

Mexico/Central America Corridor

This corridor comprises the countries of Central America and Mexico (MX/CENTAM) and includes the waters of the eastern Pacific (EPAC) and western Caribbean. This corridor historically accounts for over 50% of the transit zone flow. The highest levels of cocaine flow are consistently detected transiting the EPAC despite the relative scarcity of detection and monitoring (D&M) assets. Colombian traffickers in the eastern Pacific use either fishing vessels or go-fast (small launches with powerful motors) vessels to move the bulk of their product toward MX/CENTAM. Commercial maritime vessels are also used to transship lesser amounts to world markets from the west coast of South America. Cocaine en route to Mexico from South America is normally transferred to Mexican vessels on the high seas of the eastern Pacific. Transfers from Colombian to Mexican vessels have been detected over 500 nautical miles off the coast of Mexico. Recent seizures and intelligence indicate traffickers have returned to using fishing boats to ship multi-ton loads of cocaine to Mexico rather than long-range go-fast operations (which transport smaller loads). In the western Caribbean, go-fast vessels carry cocaine from South America to destinations in Central America and Mexico. Cocaine arriving in Central America subsequently moves overland along the Pan American Highway toward Mexico. The high volume of legitimate tractor-trailer commerce makes detection, interdiction, and apprehension difficult. Moreover, overland trafficking can begin anywhere in Central America as a subsequent segment of either air delivery to remote airfields or go-fast delivery along the Pacific and Caribbean littorals.

Caribbean Corridor

Maritime vessels, including go-fast boats, bulk cargo freighters, and containerized cargo vessels are the most common conveyances for moving large quantities of cocaine through the Caribbean to the U.S. Traffickers routinely transport cocaine from Colombia to clandestine landing strips in the Caribbean, using single or twin-engine aircraft. Traffickers also airdrop cocaine loads to waiting land vehicles and/or maritime vessels. Couriers handle smaller quantities on commercial flights to the U.S. on their person, in their baggage or by ingesting up to one kilogram of the product.

The island of Hispanola is just under 430 miles from Colombia's most northern point, and easily accessible by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500–700 kilos of cocaine. The two countries on the island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic present an ideal location for the staging and transshipment of drugs. There is effectively no border control between the two countries, allowing essentially unimpeded traffic back and forth. In addition, Haiti has no effective law enforcement or judicial system, so there are few legal impediments to drug trafficking. Recent statistics released by the IACM indicate that approximately 15 % of the cocaine entering the U.S. transits either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Spurred by the numerous uncontrolled points of entry, and encouraged by internal instability, vast amounts of narcotics from South America arrive in Haiti through the porous border with the Dominican Republic for further shipment to Puerto Rico.

Just 80 miles from the East coast of Hispanola, Puerto Rico is easily accessible by plane or boat. The key to the drug trade in Puerto Rico is the island's U.S. Commonwealth status. Once a shipment of cocaine reaches Puerto Rico, it is unlikely to be subjected to further U.S. Customs inspections. International drug trafficking organizations increasingly use the island as a major point of entry for smuggling multi-ton quantities of cocaine into the U.S., primarily as a gateway for cities on the East coast. Puerto Rico's 300-mile coastline, the vast number of isolated quays, and six million square miles of open water between the U.S. and Colombia make the region difficult to patrol and ideal for a variety of smuggling methods. Puerto Rico is an active Caribbean maritime and air transportation thoroughfare. The island has the third busiest seaport in North America and fourteenth busiest in the world as well as approximately 75 daily commercial airline flights to the continental U.S., an attractive logistical opportunity for drug trafficking organizations. Criminal organizations rely on their financial capabilities to corrupt mechanics, longshoremen, airline employees, and ticket agents, as well as government officials and others. Not only has corruption of legitimate business become a problem on the island but Colombian drug organizations routinely pay local organizations up to 20 percent of the load for their services. This form of payment has acted as a catalyst for the development of a very profitable, but competitive, market for local distribution. This "spill-over" has resulted in an increase in violence and bloodshed. It is estimated that about 80 percent of all documented homicides in Puerto Rico are drug related. Law enforcement efforts are further impeded by the close-knit relationships between the drug trafficking organizations that have developed over the years.

Puerto Rico, like Hispanola, is easily reachable by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilograms of cocaine. The go-fast boats make their round-trip cocaine runs to the southern coast of Puerto Rico in less than a day. Today, cocaine traffickers from Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into the largest staging area in the Caribbean for illicit drugs destined for the U.S. market. Once the illicit narcotics are smuggled into Puerto Rico, they are routinely stored in secluded, mountainous areas of the island until transportation to the continental U.S. can be arranged. The contraband is then repackaged into smaller shipments in preparation for the move.

U.S. Arrival Zone

Cocaine is smuggled into the U.S. at various border entry regions (see Figure A4). The 2,400-mile southwest border with Mexico, poses a particularly vexing challenge. Figure A5 details the amount of cocaine that arrives at each entry region prior to seizures at the border¹⁶. Most cocaine enters the U.S. via Florida and the southwest border. Once the eight-year period, quantities arriving at the southwest border have increased at the expense of quantities arriving at Florida. Other regions have remained fairly constant except for Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands, which recorded an increase from 11 metric tons in 1996 to 42 metric tons in 1997.

Trafficker Adaptability

Traffickers change routes, conveyances, concealment methods, processing locations, and even coca growing areas in response to effective counterdrug operations, adapting in both the sources and transit zones. At the source, traffickers practice better communications security than in the past. Land and river routes from Peru to Colombia were developed in response to the air-bridge denial program. Conveyances have continually improved in the transit zone. The low profile vessel (hard to see but easy to interdict) evolved to the go-fast (hard to interdict, but detectable) to a go-fast version that uses blue tarps (hard to detect and very difficult to interdict). The go-fast vessels have changed as well, with more powerful engines and larger fuel tanks. Cocaine packaging has improved in response to the detection capabilities of the ion scan¹⁷; some packaging no longer allows even minute trace amounts to escape. Hidden compartments are now almost standard on motherships.

Air routes have changed considerably. In the mid-1990's Boeing 727s and Caravelle jets were used for multi-ton shipments from Colombia to Mexico. Several successful seizures induced traffickers to use smaller planes and change the destination to Guatemala. Traffickers have the resources and have continually demonstrated the ability to respond to effective sustained counter-drug operations.

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