III. Disrupting Drug Markets
The policies and programs of the National Drug Control Strategy are guided by the fundamental insight that the illegal drug trade is a market, and both users and traffickers are affected by market dynamics. By disrupting this market, the U.S. Government seeks to undermine the ability of drug suppliers to meet, expand, and profit from drug demand. Drug control programs focused on market disruption attempt to reduce the profits and raise the risks involved in drug trafficking. The desired result is a reduced incentive for traffickers or would-be traffickers to enter or remain in the illicit trade. Moreover, these programs generate and exacerbate the challenges involved in the drug trade by forcing traffickers to modify their practices, identify new accomplices, and choose new methods of operation that increase the cost, risk, and complexity of smuggling drugs. The U.S. Government and its international partners focus on eradicating drug crops, interdicting drug production and movement, and attacking drug-trafficking organizations and their financial facilitators with support from critical information and intelligence activities.
Colombia and the Andes
The Andean Ridge is the sole supplier of the world's cocaine and a major provider of the heroin consumed in the United States. Although Colombia is the predominant source of both illicit drugs, any plan targeting cocaine and heroin production must consider the latent capacity within Bolivia and Peru. Drug production and trafficking in Ecuador and Venezuela must also be considered. The Administration's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) addresses all of these concerns and is yielding promising results. President Uribe and the Government of Colombia are firmly committed to countering the threat that drug trafficking poses to Colombia, the Western Hemisphere, and the world. Colombia and the United States are solid partners in a combined strategy of eradication, interdiction, and organizational attack. The President's Budget requests $721.5 million to continue ACI in 2007.
In 2004, Colombia sprayed more than 131,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicated another 10,279 hectares. The Government of Colombia reported spraying more than 138,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicating more than 31,000 hectares in 2005. These efforts have reduced cultivation by one-third since 2001 and have reduced potential pure cocaine production from 700 metric tons in 2001 to 430 metric tons in 2004. The attack on opium poppy has been just as relentless. In the past two years, Colombia has sprayed 4,660 hectares of poppy and manually eradicated another 1,700. Poppy cultivation has decreased by two-thirds since 2001, and potential heroin production decreased to 3.8 metric tons from 11.4 metric tons in 2001.
The United States and Colombia must work to secure and extend the success of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Plan Colombia by aggressively countering trafficker responses to the success of ongoing eradication, interdiction, and organizational attack programs. Increased aerial eradication capability is necessary to attack replanting efforts more swiftly. Additional focus must be placed on identifying new cultivation of coca and opium poppy, particularly in more remote areas. The United States also will support Colombia in coordinated efforts to increase interdiction pressure against drug-movement corridors within Colombia and to target the most vulnerable segments of the Colombian supply chain through organizational attack.
Furthermore, the United States must continue its support and assistance to democracy and rule of law programs in Colombia as part of our comprehensive effort to stem the flow of drugs to this country.
The election of President Evo Morales in Bolivia presents challenges to US counternarcotics policy in that country. President Morales has said that his strategy is zero cocaine but not zero coca. This proclamation notwithstanding, our analysis indicates that most of the coca leaf cultivated in Bolivia, to include the licit crop, is converted into cocaine base. Therefore, any loosening of the restrictions on coca cultivation will likely result in increased cocaine production. President Morales mentioned that there would be no free cultivation of coca leaf, and backed these words up by restarting eradication shortly after his ascension to the presidency. Unfortunately, after protests and threats from radical cocaleros, eradication was halted on January 31, 2006 and has made only halting progress since then. The Bolivian president has also expressed concern with the military's participation in eradication operations and has talked of removing them from the process. This would further undermine containment, as their experience and equipment make them mission-essential to any and all eradication efforts. President Morales' political base may also cause difficulties and impair his ability to effectively carry out counternarcotics policy in Bolivia . We are monitoring these developments and working closely with the Department of State to bring to bear whatever influence we can to minimize the degree to which President Morales' policies undermine recent counterdrug successes.
Peru and Bolivia remain the second and third largest producers of cocaine, with Peru producing 165 metric tons and Bolivia some 70 metric tons of pure cocaine in 2005. The United States has been and, to the extent possible, intends to continue working with these two countries in eventually reducing their illicit coca cultivation to negligible amounts, while creating an inhospitable environment for those considering reentry into cultivation, cocaine production, and transportation of the illicit product.
Mexico and the Southwest Border
The harsh climate, vast geography, and sparse population of the American Southwest have long challenged law enforcement along the roughly 2,000-mile border with Mexico. In addition to the 33 legitimate crossing points, the border includes hundreds of miles of open desert, rugged mountains, and the Rio Grande River, providing an ideal environment for cross-border criminal activity. Most illicit drugs that enter the United States are smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border, which drug traffickers exploit in two directions, smuggling drugs from Mexico into the United States and moving billions of dollars in illicit drug profits from the United States back into Mexico. Because the U.S. Government's counterdrug, counterterror, and immigration enforcement missions are interrelated, improved counterdrug efforts also will enhance border security. In February 2005, the Homeland Security Advisor directed the development of a strategy to address the drug threat to the Southwest Border. Interagency efforts are culminating in a coordinated National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy that will identify key strategic objectives and provide specific recommendations to address the illicit narcotics threat and significantly improve overall interdiction efforts along the Southwest Border. In support of these efforts, the President's 2007 Budget includes new drug-related resources for Customs and Border Protection of over $152 million.
Most illicit drugs that enter the United States are smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border. During the presidency of Vicente Fox, Mexico has demonstrated its commitment to countering the drug threat through its large-scale opium poppy and marijuana eradication programs. The Mexican Army and the Attorney General's Office conduct eradication operations, and these programs consistently eradicate at least 80 percent of the opium poppy and marijuana cultivated each year.
This commitment to effective eradication is clearly reflected in its impact on Mexican opium poppy cultivation. In 2004, Mexico eradicated nearly 16,000 hectares of opium poppy, causing cultivation to drop 27 percent, from 4,800 hectares in 2003 to 3,500 hectares in 2004. Potential heroin production in Mexico fell by 25 percent over the same period, down from 12 metric tons in 2003 to 9 metric tons in 2004. Mexico 's commitment to eradication has also reduced the country's marijuana cultivation. As a result of the eradication of 29,606 hectares of marijuana in 2004, marijuana cultivation fell 23 percent, from 7,500 hectares in 2003 to 5,800 hectares in 2004. Marijuana potential production, although still high by historical standards, fell from 13,400 metric tons in 2003 to an estimated 10,400 metric tons in 2004. As of November 2005, the Mexican Government reported that it had eradicated 30,883 hectares. The impact of these eradication efforts is amplified by the roughly 2,000 additional metric tons of marijuana that Mexico seizes annually.
The Fox Administration still faces significant challenges. Mexican trafficking organizations have generated unprecedented violence, especially in border cities. Although Mexico has attempted an array of initiatives, it has yet to extradite a major active drug trafficker to the United States. To help overcome these challenges, the United States and Mexico will continue to work to address our shared problem with drug production and trafficking.
Methamphetamine and Other Synthetics
Since the early 1990s, and especially over the last few years, the use of synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine and certain prescription drugs, has become a severe and troubling problem, both at the national level and in affected communities. The most devastating of these synthetic drugs has been methamphetamine, but in some areas, so-called “club drugs” such as Ecstasy have also become a major concern. The abuse of prescription drugs, particularly narcotic pain relievers, has become the second most prevalent form of drug abuse.
In response to these developments, in October 2004 the Federal government released the National Synthetic Drugs Action Plan, the first comprehensive national plan to address the problems of synthetic and pharmaceutical drug trafficking and abuse. The Action Plan outlined current Federal and state efforts in the areas of prevention, treatment, regulation, and law enforcement and made concrete recommendations for enhancing government efforts to reduce synthetic drug abuse.
In the past decade and a half, methamphetamine use and its attendant negative consequences have gradually spread eastward across the United States. Between 1992 and 2002, the treatment admission rate for methamphetamine/amphetamine has increased from 10 to 52 admissions per 100,000 population aged 12 or older (an increase of over 500 percent). Additionally, between 2000 and 2004, the positive drug-testing rates among the general U.S. workforce for methamphetamine/amphetamine increased from 0.25 percent to 0.52 percent of all tests (an increase of more than 100 percent). Although the spread of methamphetamine use is troubling, there is a significant bright spot in youth use rates since the President took office. Methamphetamine use rates have dropped by almost one-third among 8th, 10th and 12th graders since 2001.
In response to the increased threat from methamphetamine, U.S. law enforcement agencies have increased their efforts to stem the flow of methamphetamine and the precursors that are used to produce it, both domestically and working with our international partners. States have also taken action. Within the past year, 35 states have passed legislation to impose new regulations on the retail sale of the methamphetamine precursor pseudoephedrine. Since the challenges vary from state to state, these restrictions vary by state in their severity and content. States with the strictest pseudoephedrine laws have seen significant reductions in the seizure of small toxic labs.
Federal efforts have also had a dramatic effect on the fight against methamphetamine. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program has 96 initiatives that are specifically focused on methamphetamine—the largest number of initiatives focused on any single drug. Further, the President's 2007 Budget includes $40.1 million for Meth lab clean-up, an increase of
$20.3 million over the 2006 enacted level. In addition, DEA has taken steps to counter the methamphetamine threat. DEA conducted Operation Wildfire, a sweep operation conducted with state and local law enforcement partners in more than 200 cities across the United States that resulted in 427 arrests and the seizure of more than 208 pounds of methamphetamine.
Although a great deal of law enforcement resources have been dedicated to fighting the spread of methamphetamine domestically, much of the success in disrupting the methamphetamine market will continue to rely on our ability to work with other countries to reduce the flow of methamphetamine and its precursors – principally pseudoephedrine and ephedrine—into the United States. In addition to working on this issue with our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, the United States continues to work with the primary producing and exporting countries for bulk ephedrine and pseudoephedrine—China, Germany, and India. Through these international efforts, we are continuing to make progress.
Transit Zone Interdiction
The 2007 Budget includes over $3.1 billion for drug-related interdiction activities, including enforcement at and between our ports-of-entry and, importantly, in the Transit Zone between the United States and South America . This Transit Zone funding in no way signals any deviation from our Source Zone concentration of efforts and support. With the close cooperation of the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice, Transit Zone interdiction accounted for the removal of hundreds of tons of cocaine from the market in 2005. Large seizures denied traffickers significant profits from selling bulk quantities of cocaine. They also prevented millions of dollars in illegal proceeds from returning to Colombia .
For the third straight year, joint service, interagency, and multi-national forces in the Transit Zone, under the able coordination of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, seized and disrupted a record amount of cocaine. Transit Zone seizures and disruptions in 2005 amounted to 254 metric tons, compared to 219 metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003. In 2005, JIATF-South air and maritime assets interdicted an impressive 66 go-fasts and 49 fishing vessels loaded with cocaine. During August 2005 alone, JIATF-South removed 45 metric tons of cocaine destined for U.S. markets, stopping seven smuggler go-fasts, a similar number of trafficker fishing vessels, and two motor vessels.
Key to these successes is the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence regarding maritime cocaine shipments. Operation Panama Express, an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) initiative managed jointly by FBI, DEA, ICE , U.S. Coast Guard and JIATF-South, has greatly expanded interdiction-related intelligence. Since its inception in February 2000, Operation Panama Express has directly contributed to the seizure of more than 392 tons of cocaine and the arrest of more than 1,000 individuals. The President's 2007 Budget includes an increase of $5.3 million for DEA's Operation Panama Express activities to enhance this important program.
JIATF-South, which integrates the interdiction efforts of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the Department of Defense, was a model of interagency coordination and efficiency in 2005. Of particular significance is JIATF-South's close working relationship with numerous allied countries—11 countries from South America and Europe have liaison officers at JIATF-South—which is critical for the synchronization of regional operations. As a result, allies such as the United Kingdom , the Netherlands , Spain , and France also seized record-breaking amounts of European-bound cocaine in the Eastern Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean in 2005—68 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 38 metric tons in 2004.
Record seizures are hurting traffickers, eroding their profits, and destabilizing the transportation sector of the cocaine industry. However, as long as fishing-vessel and speedboat drug deliveries are still getting past our defenses in the Transit Zone, more work has to be done. As the traffickers modify their strategy, we will continue to adapt and forge new initiatives that will have an even greater impact on the illicit drug market.
Afghanistan
The United States is working to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for terrorists and is no longer a major opium-producing country, or a source of instability or oppression. The production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan is a threat to the stability of both Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Recent estimates from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicate that 87 percent of the world's illegal opiates are produced in Afghanistan. In addition to all the other nefarious and debilitating consequences of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, robust drug production contributes to an environment of corruption and political and economic instability that can foster insurgent and terrorist organizations, thus threatening the democratically elected Afghan Government. The continued support of counternarcotics efforts must remain an important part of overall U.S. policy in Afghanistan.
The strategy for attacking the economic basis of the drug trade in Afghanistan reinforces other priorities in the U.S. Global War on Terror. We are committed to a counternarcotics strategy that aims to enhance stability in this fledgling democracy by attacking a source of financial and political support for terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and our allies. Our strategic objectives are to (1) build Afghan institutional capacity to sustain the battle against narcotics; (2) assist Afghan authorities to arrest, prosecute, and punish drug traffickers and corrupt Afghan officials; (3) increase the risk and provide economic alternatives to the illegal narcotics trade; and (4) support Afghan Government efforts to make the narcotics trade culturally unacceptable. Eliminating the entrenched drug trade and drug-funded corruption requires a long-term and sustained effort, to which Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has pledged his complete support and commitment. To further these objectives in 2007, the budget of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement includes $297.4 million to assist counternarcotic programs in Afghanistan. This is an increase in counternarcotics funding of $151.7 million over 2006.
Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell 48 percent from 2004 levels to 107,000 hectares in 2005. Potential opium production was estimated at 4,475 metric tons, a 10 percent decrease from 2004. The decrease in potential opium production was lower than the decrease in opium poppy cultivation because exceptionally good precipitation and minimal disease problems contributed to a rebound in opium yields. If the entire opium crop were processed, production results would equate to a potential 526 metric tons of heroin. To date, notable progress has been achieved in Afghanistan. Cultivation levels appear to have declined in 2005, primarily due to decisions by farmers to grow less poppy, rather than through substantial eradication programs.
Although we are encouraged by the decline in poppy cultivation in 2005, we remain vigilant and determined to rid Afghanistan of the scourge of the opium trade. The overall scope of the drug threat in Afghanistan remains unacceptably high. Building on these results will continue to require enormous political and administrative efforts, and we look forward to working with the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen its ability to combat this dangerous threat.
Reducing Prescription Drug Abuse
The rise in the non-medical use of prescription drugs listed as controlled substances has created a new challenge not only for traditional organizations involved in reducing drug use (e.g., law enforcement, treatment providers, and prevention specialists) but also for the medical and pharmaceutical community.
The Administration's strategy in this area focuses on preventing diversion and getting user into treatment were necessary. For example, one of the successful programs at the state level is the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP), which helps alert doctors, pharmacists, and, when appropriate, law enforcement to potential abuse of medicines. As of October 2005, a total of 27 states have operational PDMPs or are in the process of implementing them. To give a specific example of where PDMPs can help, an individual struggling with an addiction to Vicodin might go to five doctors to complain of back pain and receive five separate prescriptions for the drug, which could then be filled at five separate pharmacies. States with PDMPs help prevent doctors and pharmacists from becoming unwitting accessories to the abuse of these prescription drugs by showing information on other prescriptions given to, or filled by, the individual within the preceding weeks or months. To further strengthen this successful initiative, the President's 2007 Budget includes $9.9 million to support prescription drug monitoring programs, an increase of $2.5 million over 2006.
Another source of prescription drug abuse is the Internet, which is populated with thousands of sites that offer controlled substance prescriptions. Some Internet pharmacies operate within the law and accepted medical practice, providing a valuable service to consumers with a legitimate medical need for prescription drugs. However, the DEA has investigated cases where unscrupulous doctors have operated “pill mills” that essentially sell prescriptions or drugs after cursory or non-existent medical examinations, sometimes making use of pharmaceuticals that have been smuggled into the United States . In response to this challenge, the DEA will continue to work closely with the FDA to identify, investigate, and target online pharmacies operating outside the bounds of the law.
