Drug Infrastructure Destruction
There is a symbiotic relationship between the illegal drug business and terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC. The Government of Colombia estimates that drug trafficking in all of its manifestations is the FARC's greatest source of funds. We have seen a constant expansion of FARC and AUC involvement in illegal drug trafficking; it is not possible to imagine a large-scale drug business in Colombia operating independently of these two terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations provide security for illegal production areas, shoot at fumigation aircraft, and control cocaine and heroin manufacture and marketing at least up to the stage of off-continent sales. Inside Colombia, terrorist organizations set market prices in their areas of control, provide material and capital to growers, and set production quotas. They brutally enforce monopoly marketing arrangements within their areas of influence and control entry and exit from their territory by residents and itinerant laborers. In short, the FARC and AUC are the managers and beneficiaries of a cocaine and heroin trafficking system that effectively engages cheap labor and peasant farmers who are economically and coercively prevented from taking up alternative livelihoods. A forced tradition of illicit crop production enforced by the threat of death is the rule in FARC production zones. The AUC tends to focus on brokering coca paste in towns more than on the control of agricultural zones, but it is equally brutal in securing its towns and lines of communication for the drug trade.
By supplying training, logistical assistance, intelligence, and material to the Government of Colombia in its efforts to destroy terrorist organizations and expand the rule of law, the United States has contributed to regional democratic stability as well as the safety and security of the Colombian people. Homicides, kidnappings, and terrorism cases were all down in 2004 thanks to the reinvigorated security services and the strengthening of the criminal justice system. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office reported that two percent of complaints it received about violations of human rights and international humanitarian law implicated members of the security forces. This last statistic clearly reflects the effect of Colombian policy and is consistent with the human rights training that is mandatory for Colombian security forces. While any human rights violation or willful collaboration with human rights violators by the military is unacceptable, Colombia has made remarkable progress and the military is winning back the trust of the people.
|
|
2002
|
2003 |
2004 |
2002 vs. 2004 |
| Terrorist Attacks
|
| All Types
|
1,645 |
1,247 |
709 |
-56% |
| Electric Pylons
|
483 |
329 |
121 |
-74% |
| Towns
|
32 |
5 |
1 |
-96% |
| Roads
|
248 |
113 |
134 |
-46% |
| Massacre Victims
|
680 |
504 |
259 |
-61% |
| Kidnappings
|
2,986 |
2,200 |
1,441 |
-51% |
| Common Homicide
|
28,837 |
23,509 |
20,012 |
-30% |
To the extent that terrorism and the economic support for terrorism are attacked simultaneously, we are implementing a winning strategy for defeating both. Coca and poppy eradication along with drug interdiction cut into profits for the AUC and FARC weakening their ability to buy arms and engage in battle. Removal of those organizations and the ELN from Colombia's national landscape facilitates destruction of large-scale drug production. This in turn increases the attractiveness of legal development and attracts enhanced investment and employment creation.
Last Updated: May 12, 2005
