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Statement by Lennard J. Wolfson
Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Chairman Mark Souder, 109th Congress

"Securing America from Drugs and Terrorism"

May 10, 2005

Entire Document in Adobe Acrobat (78 kb)

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year 2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget and its support to the National Drug Control Strategy.

Whether represented by an Air Force E-3 AWACS tracking a drug-trafficking aircraft over Colombia; by a U.S. Navy frigate launching a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment to board a cocaine-carrying fishing vessel deep in the Eastern Pacific; or a U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant instructing members of the Colombian National Police CD strike force (the Junglas) to use explosives to destroy a cocaine processing lab; or a U.S. Army warrant officer in his Blackhawk piloting Afghanistan counternarcotics police to destroy an opium lab in Nangarhar- the Department of Defense plays a critical role in the President's strategy of disrupting the market for illegal drugs.

The Department of Defense provides the essential command and control, planning, communications, intelligence, and international partnerships that are the core of the National Task Forces (Joint Interagency Task Forces). DoD's contributions are complemented by the authorities, competencies, and resources of U.S. law enforcement and our allies. The Department of Defense's unique capabilities cannot be replicated by any other department or agency. No force in the world can run the integrated intelligence and planning operations like DoD; no other agency has the staff or its unique capabilities.

DoD-led units, principally the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), seized a record amount of cocaine in 2004, more than 200 metric tons (mt) in the Transit Zone, compared to 156 mts in 2003. In Colombia, DoD-trained Junglas special operations forces destroyed well over 150 cocaine HCl labs, thwarting the production of vast amounts of cocaine, and seizing, in 2004, more than 70 mts of cocaine. Furthermore, in Colombia, DoD training and support have helped transform a defensive-minded army into a force capable of launching sustained offensive operations in remote areas that were traditionally under control of the FARC. These operations, dubbed Plan Patriota, have allowed the Government of Colombia to regain control over thousands of miles of territory, while hindering narcoterrorist groups' access to drug mobility corridors. As an example, early last year the DoD-trained Colombian Army CD Brigade launched a commando raid detaining a senior FARC leader, Anayibe Rojas Valderrama a.k.a. "Sonia," marking the first time the Colombian Army has been able to deliver a significant blow to the FARC deep in their own territory. "Sonia" has since been extradited to the U.S. on cocaine trafficking charges.

This success has not come without challenges to the system. We closely review the disposition of DoD and partner nation Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) deployments. The Navy's reduction in the size of its worldwide P-3 fleet has significantly reduced DoD's long range MPA capacity, which includes their ability to dedicate assets to counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. Meanwhile, the British recently reduced their NIMROD fleet by 25 percent, cutting the number of aircraft from 21 to 16. Furthermore, the Dutch retired their entire P-3 fleet, which further reduced overall MPA capacity in the Transit Zone.

Better intelligence on drug traffickers' activity and several interagency initiatives have helped fill some gaps in long-range MPA capacity. DoD arranged free lodging for British NIMROD crews at the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Curacao, so as to offset their deployment costs and delay a planned reduction in NIMROD MPA hours. DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) added 400 flight hours per month to JIATF-South operations in the Transit Zone; the Coast Guard increased dedicated HC-130 hours and has an MPA CD gap initiative in their FY 06 budget that requests more hours and a more robust forward-deployed HC-130 maintenance capability at the Forward Operating Location in Comalapa, El Salvador, which will significantly increase Transit Zone HC-130 on-station time. USAF E-3s have also recently returned to the theater, which has allowed CBPs P-3 AEW aircraft to return to MPA missions, and retired Dutch P-3s will eventually be replaced by Fokker 60s. Finally, we are also hopeful that the Canadian military will make periodic MPA deployments to the Caribbean.

DoD is playing an important role in supporting the Administration's Afghan CN strategy and works with State (INL), DEA, other Federal agencies and our Coalition partners to ensure there is an economy of effort. The Administration's plan leverages DoD's capabilities to compliment and reinforce the efforts of other agencies and the overall CN strategy.

While making an impact in Afghanistan is not predicated solely on DoD, the military contribution is very important. Afghanistan and U.S. poppy eradication and voluntary crop reduction are crucial to reducing funds that may support narco-traffickers and terrorists, and these efforts are funded principally by the Department of State. DOJ and DEA have vital roles, and if provided adequate funding, can make a significant impact. DoD support to both is valuable, as is planning and intelligence.

U.S. counternarcotics programming is set out in a five-pillar plan that offers incentives through alternative livelihoods, combined with strong disincentives in the form of forced eradication, law enforcement, and interdiction, while a robust public information campaign helps spread President Karzai's message warning Afghans to stay out of the opium business. All of these U.S. anti-drug efforts are intended to simultaneously produce results while we build the Afghan government's capacity to conduct its own counternarcotics efforts.

Whenever possible, our military supports the U.S. Government's CN Strategy against opium cultivation and opium/heroin production and trafficking. In the last year, DoD's contributions to this strategy have been significant. DoD, in support of INL, is assisting the Afghan Border Police with specialized training, equipment, and facilities focusing on the border with Pakistan. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will oversee the construction of headquarters facilities for the Border Police and for the National Highway Police. At other major crossing points, DoD is assisting the Government of Afghanistan to improve border drug transit points along routes to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. These facilities will allow for a greater law enforcement presence, improved security, and reduced drug trafficking along these major routes.

Expanding the Afghan government's interdiction capabilities, so that its operations can result in criminal prosecutions, is essential to the overall success of the CN Strategy. Using Fiscal Year 2004 funding, DoD, in support of law enforcement, funded the ongoing training and equipping of a specialized National Interdiction Unit (NIU), an element of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. This newly developed capability consists of approximately 100 trained officers and will work closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). DoD is also constructing a base of operations that will provide spaces for housing, feeding, and additional training of these officers and provide enhanced surge capability that will put rotating teams of DEA agents in country to work with their Afghan counterparts. DoD's Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) will support the NIU with airlift, in-extremis close air support, and emergency medical evacuation if needed. U.S. Central Command is preparing to provide aerial transportation support for up to four interdiction operations per month. In addition to this support, DoD has leased two MI-8 helos for use by interdiction forces and Afghan police and DoD is in the process of refurbishing two Afghan-owned helicopters. The helicopters will be used to form an Afghan police transportation unit for the interdiction force and other police actions. A training program to build the pilot, maintenance capacity and base of operations will be provided with DoD funding and support. While pilots and maintenance crews are being trained, DoD has budgeted for contractors to provide this service.

In Afghanistan, U.S. troops are authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking targets when those military operations support our stability mission in Afghanistan. If our troops come across drugs or drug producing equipment during the conduct of other military operations, they are authorized to take action against these targets and report all drug related discoveries. Since July 14, 2004, there have been 19 reported instances of U.S. military forces encountering drugs in the course of military operations and either destroying or transferring the drugs to the appropriate Afghan authorities. Nine of those instances were in January 2005.

More recently, on March 15, U.S. military forces provided insertion, extraction and security support to six DEA agents and 36 Afghan narcotics police in a successful operation against three labs located in Nangarhar province, one of the primary sources of Afghan opium. Significantly, DEA agents, U.S. military forces and Afghan police planned, rehearsed and, finally, successfully executed this effort resulting in significant evidence collection by the DEA and the destruction of two metric tons of brown opium, 15 kilograms of high-grade white opium, as well as associated chemicals. The 36 Afghan narcotics police who participated were equipped and trained by DoD contractors and using DoD funds.

DoD also provides support to the United Kingdom-trained Afghan interdiction force, the Afghan Special Narcotics Police (ASNF). Since last summer, the ASNF has seized and destroyed no less than approximately 81 metric tons of opium, 70 heroin labs, and 28 metric tons of precursor chemicals, and has detained numerous drug traffickers. In coordination with the U.K., DoD continues to provide the ASNF with equipment, including night vision goggles. In addition, DoD is financing the refurbishment of an additional MI-8 helicopter to compliment the U.K.-refurbished MI-8s used by this force.

To improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations, DoD established counter-narcoterrorism Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) within Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Intelligence packages developed in part by the CFC-A cell have been used in several successful interdiction operations, including those of the ASNF. The cell is working closely with other U.S. Government agencies, such as the Department of State and DEA, as well as our U.K. partners. The Afghan center will not only house counternarcotics information in support of interdiction and prosecution, but will support police operations against insurgent and other illicit activities. This database will be the first step in reconstructing Afghanistan's criminal justice records which were destroyed by the last two decades of war. In Fiscal Year 2005, we will continue to support this effort and expand its capability.

Despite commitments in three wars, Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terror, DoD remains committed to the war on drugs and their efforts have made a real difference in reducing the amount of drugs from entering the United States and denying millions in drug proceeds from getting into terrorist groups hands. DoD's ability to do this reflects upon the perseverance and dedication of the men and women in the armed services and we are all truly grateful for their efforts.


Department of Defense Budget Breakdown

 

(Budget Authority in Millions)

 
2004 Final
2005 Enacted
2006 Request

Drug Resources by Function

Intelligence

$125.316

$134.381

$128.421

Interdiction

499.867

431.841

468.550

Investigations

49.521

49.213

46.720

Prevention

110.782

120.141

122.345

Research & Development

14.357

18.284

16.347

State and Local Assistance

146.732

147.151

107.690

Treatment

6.680

5.511

5.668

Total

$953.255

$906.522

$895.741

Drug Resources by Decision Unit

Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account

$880.255

$906.522

$895.741

Afghanistan Supplemental Account

73.000

----

----

Total

$953.255

$906.522

$895.741

Drug Resources Personnel Summary

Total FTEs (direct only)

1,405

1,421

1,421

Information

Total Agency Budget (Billions)

$441.7

$402.6

$419.3

Drug Percentage

0.2%

0.2%

0.2%



2006 Request

  • The department's FY 2006 Central Transfer Account request of $895.7 million reflects price growth of $18.7 million and a program decrease of $29.4 million from the FY 2005 enacted amount of $906.5 million. The department's FY 2006 counter-narcoterrorism budget will continue to fund, within fiscal constraints, an array of effective programs that support the Strategy's and department's goals.

    • Demand Reduction ($128.0 million): A total of $19.8 million is for the National Guard State Plans and Service outreach programs, and the Young Marines outreach program, and $108.2 million is for the continued support of DoD Demand Reduction programs.

    • Domestic Support ($199.1 million): Of this amount, $152.7 million is for the portion of the total National Guard State Plans that supports domestic law enforcement efforts and the counter-narcoterrorism schools; $14.1 million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as NORTHCOM counter-narcoterrorism support to DLEAs and Title 10 National Guard translation efforts; and $32.3 million is for Tethered Aerostats.

    • Intelligence, Technology and Other ($139.6 million): A total of $87.7 million is for counter-narcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis; $25.8 million is for SIGINT collection and processing; $12.1 million is for Service and SOCOM command and control programs; and $13.9 million is for CN Technology efforts.

    • International Support ($429.1 million): Funding of $177.5 million supports operations in U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command AORs, including Section 1033 support. Resources of $180.7 million are for detection and monitoring platforms and assets; and $70.9 million is for AOR Command and Control support, including operations of Joint-Interagency Task Forces West and South.






Last Updated: December 27, 2005