


PUERTO RICO • US VIRGIN ISLANDS



HIDTA
HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA

Annual Report *CY 2005*

Commissioner Elton Lewis—Chair Executive Board

SAC Luis Fraticelli—Vice Chair Executive Board

Mr. Jose M. Alvarez—HIDTA Director

Mrs. Catherine L. Mills—Deputy HIDTA Director

Mr. Guillermo Miranda—HIDTA Executive Officer

P.O. Box 366264, San Juan, PR 00936

"A" Street Mario Julia Industrial Park, Puerto Nuevo, PR 00918

Telephones: 787-474-8701 Fax 787-474-8716

E-Mail: jalvarez@prvi.hidta.net or cmills@prvi.hidta.net

"COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE"

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The PR/USVI High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area¹ (PR/USVI HIDTA) continues to experience violent crime in its communities associated with Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and their related criminal activities. The National HIDTA program philosophy, tailored to each jurisdiction's needs, is an excellent methodology to develop a strategic plan involving federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies guided by its Executive Board (EB) using a balanced mix of resources. This strategic plan specifically addresses the Threat across both jurisdictional boundaries of Puerto Rico (PR and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI)). To its credit, this approach has worked extremely well for both jurisdictions for the last ten years. It has made it easier to eradicate the boundaries between two jurisdictions which are separated by 14 miles of water.

The EB in 2004 strengthened its leadership role through the development of a three pronged approach intended as a guide to all Initiatives in their efforts toward the disruption/dismantling of DTOs or Money Laundering Organizations (MLOs). In FY2005, this clear directive was maintained and enforced and is recognized as part of the strategic planning to ensure an increase in effectiveness with all Initiatives operating under this approach. This Report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations within the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner.

- Effectiveness in dismantling DTOs and MLOs requires the development of a cohesive and seamless approach that spans over two jurisdictions separated by water. With this as a goal, there are 26 federal and non-federal collaborating law enforcement organizations with 20 agencies conforming the EB.
- Regional Law Enforcement Initiatives continue to pursue DTOs and MLOs, using all the capabilities of the Intelligence Support Center (ISC) to make significant progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling or disrupting the most complex, threatening, as well as violent, drug traffickers, money launderers, drug related weapons traffickers, drug dealers and violent criminals, to include fugitives.
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates indicate that approximately 12 metric tons of cocaine transship monthly through PR, with 80-90% destined to the United States via ports and airports¹.
- The sale of illicit drugs is widely recognized as highly profitable. It is the goal of the HIDTA to target those profits. For 2005, the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at \$157.4 million, or a Return on Investment (ROI) of \$22 for every dollar invested; a cost-effective use of resources.
- For this reporting year the combined ROI for this HIDTA is \$24 versus a law enforcement budget of \$7.3 million.

¹ For the purpose of this document, note that the reference to HIDTA should be construed as meaning the PR/USVI HIDTA except where otherwise noted.
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- Eight MLOs were identified and/or targeted during CY 2005. Two were dismantled / disrupted for a success rate of 25%.
- Drug assets seized during CY 2005 were valued at \$10.3 million and impacted DTOS and MLOs by reducing the availability of resources at their disposal. Not only were the assets seized, but was a visible reminder to the general public about the hazards to follow a criminal lifestyle.
- The main goal of every HIDTA is to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs. Toward this end, 123 DTOs were identified and, of these, 123 were targeted. By the end of the year: 22% were disrupted and 9% dismantled of those that were targeted; for a total of 31% combined. Of the 8 identified and targeted MLOs a combined 25% were dismantled or disrupted.
- The HIDTA increasingly addresses large, complex DTOs and MLOs. Its goal is to disrupt/dismantle organizations that are known to cause significant damage in the region through their illegal activities. It is recognized that results take longer when targeting these larger and more sophisticated DTOs; however, the benefits are well known. A review of the statistical information provided in this Annual Report reveals success in this area: from the 123 DTOs/MLOs investigations, 66 were carried over from 2004, 57 were newly opened. Of these, 123 DTOs/MLOs, 65 were international, 14 were multi-state, 44 were local, 42 were OCDEF designated cases, and nine were identified in the RPOT list.
- This HIDTA continues to experience violent crime in its communities believed to be associated with DTOs and their related criminal activities. Drug abuse remains the primary social problem in those areas, and its demand has substantially maintained a high rate of violent crime. During CY2005, the HIDTA Region experienced a high crime rate: 807 murders, 247 rapes, 5,832 aggravated assaults, 19,125 burglaries, 30,076 property thefts, and 9,681 auto thefts. Ninety percent of all crime is believed to be drug related.
- Federal law enforcement investigations reflect that cocaine and crack cocaine continues to be abused in PR and the USVI. Both maritime and air methods are used to transship large amounts of cocaine through the region to the United States. Dominican Republic groups continue to be the most dominant transporters of the cocaine. Considerable quantities of cocaine are driven across the border in Hispaniola, from Haiti to the Dominican Republic for eventual shipment to PR or other destinations.
- Marijuana availability and abuse in PR and the USVI continues to be high. It is perceived however, as a lesser threat than cocaine and heroin, inasmuch as it causes less violent crimes, as evidenced by DEA reporting. Most marijuana available in PR is produced in Mexico and transported from the southwestern United States. In the USVI locally grown marijuana is most common. Marijuana is consumed by large sections of the population, including individuals with legitimate employment and college students.

- The ISC was streamlined to 38 collocated agents and analysts, with only one HIDTA funded employee and investigative support staff from all agencies. It continues to produce refined intelligence products that guide complex investigations for all the investigative task forces. The ISC is a critical and costly operation, but has proven its ROI many times over.
- This highly technical ISC is structured and located in a neutral location, interconnected worldwide, to include the Department of Defense's SIPIRNET, and to local, state, federal and international law enforcement organizations that enables our law enforcement community to more effectively address the Threat within the region. Its law enforcement/analytical personnel are supported to the maximum extent possible by full time National Guard in specialized areas. As such, they fill a critical intelligence need and provide four to six Intelligence Analysts which reduces reliance on HIDTA funding.

This report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations within the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner. In 2005, the EB continued centralized efforts in addressing the two National goals. The first consists on **disrupting the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting DTOs / MLOs**. This clear directive serves to narrow the focus and unity of purpose used by all HIDTA initiatives in maximizing their effectiveness.

- The first priority of the National HIDTA goals seeks to capitalize on the engagement of producers and transit counties or regions like the Caribbean in order to address the drug trade as a business-one that faces numerous and often overlooked obstacles that may be used as pressure points. The drug trade is not an unstoppable force but rather a profit-making enterprise that can be disrupted. Coupled with our efforts to reduce the demand, every action that makes the drug trade more costly and less profitable works to "break" the market. Following is an example:
- The AMF organization was investigated as of late 2003. This DTO was responsible for cocaine, cocaine base (crack), heroin and marijuana distribution in multiple public housing communities. The DTO was known to be extremely violent and Intelligence indicates that the organization was responsible for over 45 murders during a 12 month period. Most of these murders are believed to be related to a war between rival DTOs. On a monthly basis they were reputed to receive shipments of 50 to 100 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican nationals with half being kept on-island and the remainder transported to CONUS.

Agents successfully identified a painting business, used by the DTO to warehouse the drugs and serving as a "front" to launder proceeds of drug sales. The subject owned the business by purchasing winning lottery tickets to launder drug proceeds as well as properties under other people's names to hide his drug proceed assets. Investigation revealed that two bank accounts, identified through FinCEN checks were used to launder their proceeds. Confidential sources identified DTO assets and culminated with the arrest of the subject in November of 2005 and an indictment against 48 members of his DTO and some of a rival

DTO in December 2005. To date, 39 individuals have been taken into custody and the crime rate of the area has reduced to less than 20% of previous trend.

- The second National HIDTA goal is to **improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA Initiatives**. In doing so, PR/USVI HIDTA continues to be the driving force in the law enforcement area in the region. The focus on training, sharing of resources and information/intelligence, particularly the support from the ISC allows for greater efficiency and productivity in the law enforcement area. The EB, as comprised of an evenly divided twenty federal and non-federal law enforcement agency heads, ensures that a unified approach is used to achieve the clearly agreed upon goals.

II. INTRODUCTION

The PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to present this Annual Report to document its most significant activities and achievements that occurred in CY2005. To fully appreciate the achievements, it is important to understand how each HIDTA is structured, and why it exists. The Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), designates regions with critical drug trafficking problems adversely impacting the United States, as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Thus, the national HIDTA is comprised of 28 individual HIDTAs spread throughout the country, and uniquely situated to counteract this illicit activity. HIDTAs play a significant role in addressing real world drug and drug-related problems, and offer real world solutions. The PR/USVI HIDTA is similar in this regard and has developed or encouraged the development of working relationships with over 26 federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies in joint pursuit of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs.

Law enforcement initiatives are clear on their prioritization of dismantling and/or disrupting DTOs and MLOs. Of particular importance are those that most substantially endanger the communities of the region by the violent manner in which they conduct their illegal activities.

The PR/USVI HIDTA's EB's strong leadership and commitment to success have played decisive role in the achieving of performance measures for these reporting periods. The EB's leadership strategy was guided by establishing specific goals and objectives in support of the National Drug Control Strategy to focus the investigative efforts of the Initiatives and enhance their productivity. The PR/USVI HIDTA's EB composition solidifies the partnership among federal and non-federal agencies by enhancing participation and ensuring equality among all participants. The resulting balanced Strategy of intelligence, interdiction, investigative/enforcement and support initiatives has served as a force multiplier to enable the disrupting and dismantling of drug trafficking, money laundering and supporting crime organizations.

The overall HIDTA mission is embodied by the National Program Mission Statement:

**National HIDTA
Program Mission Statement**

The mission of the HIDTA Program is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States by assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and disrupt DTOs with particular emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United States.

The PR/USVI HIDTA EB during 2005 focused on the vision, mission, goals and objectives that personify the efforts undertaken by the law enforcement entities comprising its initiatives. To that end, this information is shared with you.

**PR/USVI HIDTA
Mission Statement**

The PR/USVI HIDTA participating agencies create intelligence driven task forces comprised of federal, state and local law enforcement agents who focus on at eliminating or reducing drugs trafficking and its associated criminal consequences within the domestic environment.

**PR/USVI HIDTA
Vision Statement**

HIDTA will continue to develop and operate a major intelligence driven joint investigation system, using the latest technology and with full participation by all local, state and federal agencies. This seamless integration of land, sea and air resources will continue to be dedicated to dismantling and disrupting major DTOs operating in the Caribbean Basin (i.e., RPOTS/CPOTS) and their related criminal activities, with a specific focus in the area of money laundering. This system will continue to be manned by a highly trained and effective law enforcement work force.

Reporting Period: This Annual Report covers the reporting period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005.

Budget Allocation: The HIDTA has a budget of \$9,084,494. The HIDTA strives to reduce administrative costs to allow maximum budgetary allocations to be used for


operational activities. Periodic evaluation of service contracts occurs to seek to reduce costs even further. Effective property management redirects surplus items into initiatives that need them and particular attention is paid in the trade-in of obsolete equipment against the cost of the new to further increase our cost effectiveness; a practice that obtained commendations from the auditors. Obsolete equipment is auctioned and the proceeds are reinvested in the program.

Geographic Area of Responsibility: The HIDTA covers two separate island jurisdictions: PR and the USVI. This area is a primary arrival and transit zone of drugs originating from many foreign countries through hundreds of miles of ocean, which further complicates interdiction operations. The jurisdictions are separated by 14 miles, or 12 nautical miles, as measured by their nearest populated islands (St. Thomas and Culebra). Each jurisdiction is comprised of larger inhabited islands and smaller islets and cays. While the uninhabited islets and cays are frequently used by the general population for recreational enjoyment, they are also used by the criminal element as drug stashing points. Specifically, the inhabited islands are:

- Puerto Rico:** Islands of Puerto Rico, Culebra, Mona and Vieques.
- Virgin Islands:** Islands of St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas and Water Island.

Within the HIDTA, the areas where drug related criminal activity is most noted in PR are the San Juan Metro Area (Bayamon, Carolina, Guaynabo, Caguas, Toa Baja, as well as San Juan) and the cities of Fajardo and Ponce. In the USVI, the islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas are those with the higher rates of drug related criminal activity, primarily in or around the densely populated public housing communities.

INITIATIVES DISTRIBUTION ALONG THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CY 2005



The jurisdictions in the HIDTA are ripe for the transshipment of drugs into the CONUS, as well as its related criminal activities, due to substantial coastlines, not just of the seven populated islands, but also as previously mentioned the hundreds of small cays and islets. This is also contributed to the areas low per capita income. Other impacting factors include the high volume of shipping containers, the transient nature of tourism based economies, and the significant number of cruise ships that daily traverse the ports of PR and the USVI, which all contribute to making it attractive for use as a smuggling route. This has to be placed within the backdrop of high part one crime rates associated with the drug trade, accountable for over 90% of crime, particularly murder. It is critical to note that the PR/USVI HIDTA has been designated a High Intensity Financial Crimes Area (HIFCA) due to the areas frequent use as a conduit for money laundering.

III. NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS

HIDTAs nationally have adopted two specific goals to be achieved in meeting the drug challenge. These two national goals guide all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout the United States. The PR/USVI HIDTA is proud to present these national HIDTA program goals, plus concise summaries of its Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 and resultant Strategy in the following sections. The PR/USVI HIDTA has fashioned an individual strategy to meet local drug threats according to its individual needs, in conjunction with the national objectives:

NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations; and

Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.

The EB, in addition to supporting the National HIDTA goals, developed region specific objectives and subsequently required each Initiative to operate within that framework. Initiatives are required to annually appear before the Board and demonstrate their progress in achieving the below goals and objectives. Performance Management Process (PMP) Core Tables are used as the standard briefing model.

A) Goal 1: Reduce drug availability by eliminating/disrupting drug trafficking or MLOs.

1) Objectives Intelligence:

- i) Develop and expand on intelligence trends and patterns used by traffickers, money launderers, violent gangs and terrorist groups operating within or affecting PR/USVI.
- ii) Identify weaknesses that are within commercial carrier systems and the U.S. Postal System that are used by organizations trafficking weapons and drugs.

2) Objectives Interdiction:

- i) Target organizations that smuggle, sell, stash, or distribute illegal drugs and firearms engaged in other violent crimes.
- ii) Target trafficking organizations smuggling drugs from South America through the Caribbean basin to PR/USVI with a focus on RPOTS and CPOTS.

3) Objectives Money Laundering:

- i) Identify money laundering trends and techniques used to facilitate the movement of illegal and illicit proceeds.
- ii) Disrupt and dismantle MLOs or systems by conducting investigations and undercover operations.
- iii) Attack and seize illegally obtained proceeds and assets of DTOs (e.g. RPOTS/CPOTS).

B) Goal 2: Improve efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts within HIDTA.

1) Objectives Intelligence:

- i) Identify smuggling, trafficking and money laundering activities that could adversely affect the soundness of public institutions in PR/USVI.
- ii) Improve intelligence sharing among HIDTA initiatives.
- iii) Increase ISC use and effectiveness through participation and sharing of information by all HIDTA agencies.
- iv) Explore, identify and acquire new technology and innovative techniques that enhance the mission of HIDTA.
- v) Increase information building and sharing with all reliable U.S. intelligence sources.
- vi) Ensure that any pertinent databases/information systems be shared with the ISC to facilitate the dissemination to all agency representatives assigned to the ISC in support to each HIDTA initiative investigations.

2) Objectives Interdiction:

- i) Maintain a robust, professional interagency maritime interdiction force around/between PR and the USVI.
- ii) Enhance the maritime air cargo information sharing to increase the intelligence collection and analyze responses for successful interdiction.

3) Objectives Money Laundering:

- i) Provide training to state, local and federal and non federal law enforcement officers participating in HIDTA

IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005

The PR/USVI HIDTA prides itself on maximizing and strategically using HIDTA funding to achieve results. In 2005, this was assisted by the development of a strong Threat Assessment which only occurred after a major and intense collaborative effort by multiple federal and non federal law enforcement agencies in the ISC. This Threat

Assessment serves as the basis from which the strategic plan evolves. The reader is referred to *The PR/USVI HIDTA Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005* for details on the threats identified. The following summary is presented for your easy reference.

The two jurisdictions of PR and the USVI, mid-point junctures between CONUS and the source countries, continues to be attractive as the transport conduit for the transit of illicit drug destined to CONUS. The regions attractiveness is derived from:

- A. Substantial coastlines, seven populated islands, plus hundreds of small cays and islets that serves as stashing site;
- B. Low per capita incomes of the area;
- C. Influx of illegal aliens mainly from the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti and Canada;
- D. Notably higher transient populations found in tourism based economies.

Regional Characterizations: According to the DEA, the region is characterized by a continuous increase in cocaine and heroin coming from Colombia through the Eastern Caribbean corridor and also using the alternate route through Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

- Drug-related violence in the PR/USVI region is rampant. Ninety percent of homicides in PR, in which a motive could be determined, were drug-related
- Political and economic disruptions are causing a large increase in the number of inhabitants fleeing Haiti and the Dominican Republic. U.S. Coast Guard migrant interdictions of marine vessels coming from Hispaniola in CY2005 were anticipated to result in more than double that of CY2004. In many cases the vessels used to transport illegal aliens, when tested by ION scans, reveal that they apparently have also been used to transport drugs.
- Cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are widely available and abused throughout the region. Heroin is more prevalent in Puerto Rico, but is also used within the Hispanic community on St. Croix. Designer drugs, diverted pharmaceuticals, and other drugs such as hallucinogens are available and abused to a lesser extent.

Primary Drug Threat: Cocaine is the primary drug threat in PR and the USVI. It is readily available throughout the region. Cocaine seizures have been significant. The drug is transported primarily in maritime vessels from Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican DTOs are the primary transporters of cocaine. Dominican and Puerto Rican organizations are the primary wholesale and retail distributors of the drug. Cocaine is smuggled first into the USVI from the British Virgin Islands, with an origination point of Colombia through St. Maarten and stashed for shipment into PR for eventual shipment to CONUS. "Cocaine leaves PR via maritime bulk freighters and on commercial airlines either in the possession of couriers or concealed in cargo."²

Heroin... A Serious Problem: Heroin is a serious problem in PR. South American heroin is widely available and responsible for more substance abuse treatment

² *The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment*, September 2003, DEA-03014, page 30
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admissions than any other illicit drug. Heroin is transported into the region primarily by couriers aboard commercial aircraft and by parcel delivery services from Colombia or transit areas such as the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands Antilles, and Venezuela. Maritime smuggling is less frequent, although heroin occasionally is seized from passengers and crew members on cruise ships. Puerto Rican and Dominican criminal groups are the primary distributors of heroin.



Marijuana Availability: Marijuana is readily available throughout PR and the USVI. It is the most widely abused drug in the region and its use is particularly high among adolescents and young adults. Most marijuana is produced in Mexico and transshipped from the southwestern United States. The drug typically is transported via couriers on commercial aircraft and via package delivery services. Some marijuana is

produced in the region and law enforcement has noted an increase in indoor, hydroponics marijuana production. Puerto Rican criminal groups and independent dealers are the primary transporters, and wholesale and retail distributors of marijuana.

Designer Drugs: Designer drugs, specifically MDMA, do not pose an increasing threat in the region. The drug is not the drug of choice among teens and young adults. MDMA often is transported from Europe and the Dominican Republic via couriers aboard commercial aircraft and via parcel delivery services. Wholesale distribution does not occur in the area, retail distribution is conducted primarily by Puerto Rican independent dealers.

Other drugs: Among other drugs, diverted pharmaceuticals also appears to be an increasing problem. Law enforcement reporting and limited demand data suggest that both availability and abuse of the drugs is increasing. Inhalants are abused primarily by youth, while hallucinogens and methamphetamine rarely are abused in the region.

Money laundering: The laundering of illicit drug proceeds is extensive in PR and the USVI. Wire remitters and bulk currency shipments are the primary methods used. This has resulted in PR being designated a HIFCA. The region possesses a diverse financial sector that allows for many options regarding the laundering or transportation of illicit drug proceeds. DTOs primarily rely on bulk currency smuggling and wire remitters. Heavy gambling in the form of betting on horse races and cock fights is prevalent throughout the USVI. It is believed that drug traffickers use this as one of their means of money laundering as gambling is pervasive at these events.

V. HIDTA Strategy Summary

The reader is referred to *The PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 Strategy* for details on the PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives. The following summary is presented for your convenience.

The Strategy co-locates all law enforcement personnel to foster the sharing of intelligence and investigational resources. This is orchestrated through directives from the twenty heads of federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies that serve on the EB. This collocation also serves to provide a united front in addressing illegal drug activities in a seamless marine and land based system encompassing two separate jurisdictions. The Strategy has determined the need for an increase in intelligence presence in the USVI, and in CY2006 we plan to establish an ISC satellite office at St. Thomas.

The law enforcement initiatives focus on DTO's, money laundering groups, violent drug offenders and firearms trafficking groups, the training of law enforcement personnel assigned to HIDTA initiatives to improve their effectiveness. All initiatives provide data and receive information from the ISC that develops and expands on trends that promote Goal 1's intent to disrupt and dismantle DTOs / MLOs, as well as event and case deconfliction, enhanced officer safety and minimizing duplication in case investigation and prosecution. Fifteen Initiatives were manned during CY 2005. The HIDTA Training Initiative received no funding and the DEA Forensic Laboratory initiative was closed and their funds reprogrammed to other initiatives. The 15 Initiatives comprised were:

- 8 Investigative
- 3 Support
- 3 Interdiction
- 1 Intelligence

During CY2005, the USVI marine interdiction initiative, the Blue Lightning Strike Force funding, was increased to allow the addition of a St. Thomas Marine Unit as an extension of the St. Croix unit.

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures

PR/USVI HIDTA as part of an effort to measure initiatives achievements working within and toward the established goals and objectives commenced using the Performance Management Process (PMP) measures which provide a new capability to quantify and track HIDTA targets and monitor HIDTA results. The use in this year and subsequent years of the PMP will ensure that measurable results can be easily identified in a uniform manner at a National level. Furthermore, they will establish a base year against which achievements in future years can be placed in context. The PR/USVI HIDTA continues to annually achieve ambitious and high performance results.

A. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 1:

Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drugs trafficking and /or MLOs.

Core Table 1

Table 1: Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled for Year 2005 at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands)						
Year	DTOs Identified	Total Targeted	# Disrupted	% of Targeted Disrupted	# Dismantled	% of Targeted Dismantled
Begin 2005	66	66	15	23%	7	11%
During 2005	57	57	12	21%	4	7%
Total 2005	123	123	27	22%	11	9%

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005.

NOTE: Budget includes law enforcement initiatives ONLY. Law enforcement includes prosecution, intelligence, and law enforcement initiatives, but administration (Management/Coordination) and training initiatives are NOT included.

REMARKS: This table presents a total investigation load of 123 cases. PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives carried 66 DTOs investigations from 2004. During 2005, the initiatives identified and targeted 57 additional DTOs. By the end of calendar year 2005, the PR/USVI HIDTA disrupted 27 and dismantled 11 for a total of 38 DTOs disrupted or dismantled. In short, out of the 123 DTOs targeted in the reporting period, **31%** (38) were disrupted or dismantled, a notable achievement.

Core Table 2

Table 2: Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) [ALL DTOs; MLOs included]								
Scope	# Identified	# Targeted	# Disrupted	% of Targeted Disrupted	# Dismantled	% of Targeted Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	65	65	16	25%	6	9%	22	34%
Multi-state	14	14	3	21%	1	7%	4	29%
Local	44	44	8	18%	4	9%	12	27%
Total	123	123	27	22%	11	9%	38	31%

SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05.

NOTE: International refers to DTOs activities conducted between individuals trafficking drugs from different countries. Multi-state organization refers to conspiracy schemes using interstate/US territories localities to trafficking illegal drugs. Local refers to DTOs conspiracies within the same state or US territory.

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the DTOs disrupted or dismantled by their operational scope. In 2005, the international arena was substantially impacted by disruptions which given the nature of their organizations was of benefit not just to the region alone, but for the entire Nation.

Table 2 explains our success in terms of the operational scope of the DTOs identified and targeted in calendar year 2005. Of the 123 DTOs identified, 65 operated internationally. Initiatives targeted 65 of these major DTOs organizations, disrupting 16 and dismantling six of the larger targeted DTOs. From the 14 targeted Multi-State DTOs, one was dismantled and three were disrupted. Out of the 44 targeted local DTOs, four were dismantled and eight were disrupted. These results reflect the commitment of the PR/ USVI HIDTA to identify, target and dismantle or disrupt 34% of the large-scale DTOs within the area of operations.

Core Table 3

Table 3: Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands)								
Scope	# Identified MLOs	# Targeted	# Disrupted	% of Targeted Disrupted	# Dismantled	% of Targeted Dismantled	Total Disrupted or Dismantled	Total % Disrupted or Dismantled
International	7	7	0	0%	1	14%	1	14%
Multi-state	0	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Local	1	1	1	100%	0	0%	1	100%
Total	8	8	1	12%	1	12%	2	25%

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005.

NOTE: Breaks out a specific type of DTO - MLOs - from Table 2. Money laundering is the primary function of these organizations.

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the eight MLOs targeted for disruption or dismantling in PR/USVI HIDTA as classified by their operational scope. An excellent disruption and/or dismantling success rate of 25% are noted. In 2005, the international and local categories received the major impact resulting from investigations producing two organizations disrupted/dismantled during the year. These organizations will no longer constitute part of the underground banking system or be used to launder drug trafficking proceeds.

Core Table 4

Table 4: Operational Scope of All DTO and MLO Cases Initiated for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands)				
Scope	# CPOT Cases	# RPOT Cases	# OCDETF Cases	% OCDETF of Total DTOs Targeted
International	0	1	12	40%
Multi-state	0	0	2	22%
Local	0	0	1	6%
Total	0	1	15	27%

SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05.

NOTE: DTO refers to drug trafficking and MLOs.

REMARKS: Table 4 represents the complete inventory of the cases initiated/handled in 2005 that became very important for law enforcement and prosecution. Thus, it is a remarkable achievement that of the 57 newly opened HIDTA investigations the task forces converted 15 into OCDETF cases and one into a RPOT due to their magnitude. A total of 42 HIDTA initiated investigations are currently open as OCDETF and nine as RPOTs in the PMP database.

Tables 1-4 clearly reflect the nature of the PR/USVI HIDTA's enforcement efforts and demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its targeted outcomes. In nearly every instance, the PR/USVI HIDTA achieved or exceeded its performance targets.

Core Table 5

Table 5: Drugs Removed from the Marketplace for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands)		
Drugs Seized (kg or D.U.)	Amount Seized (kg or D.U.)	Wholesale Value
heroin kg	100.304	\$8,024,320
cocaine HCL kg	8,771.045	\$149,107,765
crack cocaine kg	1.355	\$13,550
marijuana kg	33.034	\$145,349
marijuana plants and grows	0	\$0
methamphetamine kg	0	\$0
methamphetamine ice kg	0	\$0
ecstasy(MDMA)(D.U.s)	3,000.000	\$90,000
Other	0	\$0
Total Wholesale Value		\$157,380,984

SOURCES: PR/USVI HIDTA Performance Management Process (PMP) Database CY 2005; "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2006 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2006-L0424-005.

REMARKS: Table 5 lists the drugs seized during this reporting period as presented by Task Force Supervisors to the Executive Board and End of the Year Report. Cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are the main drugs trafficked in the region. There have been some seizures of MDMA by HIDTA task forces although PR and USVI area is not known as major MDMA transshipment location."³ The total value of the seized drugs exceeded \$157 million at wholesaler price.

The seizure of large amounts of drugs, along with its proceeds, serves to substantially cripple DTO operations. During CY 2005, the PR/USVI HIDTA through such drug seizures had a significant impact on the region's drug trade. Table 5 lists the wholesale values of the respective drugs seized, thus giving an accurate view of the economic impact of removing these drugs from the marketplace. The data demonstrates achievement of goals in terms of real dollar outcomes. Despite these achievements and the dollars they reflect, the most critical success can never be measured, that of reducing the availability of drugs in the region's communities and thereby contributing to a better quality of life.

Core Table 6

Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) Table 6: Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Baseline Drug Wholesale Value	Targeted Drug ROI	Drug Wholesale Value Removed From Market	Actual Drug ROI
2004	\$6,566,297	\$120,000,000	\$18	\$284,487,240	\$43
2005	\$7,238,972	\$120,000,000	\$23	\$157,380,984	\$22

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, PMP Database & Matrix. "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2006 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2006-L0424-005.

REMARKS: The drug wholesale value average for the last three years was \$120 million or a return on the investment (ROI) of \$18. For 2005, the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at \$157.4 millions, or a return on the investment of \$22 for every dollar invested in the investigative and interdiction efforts. This achievement is considered notable despite the restrictions imposed by a constrained budget. As to the future of the HIDTA Program, the morale was always high, and TFO put forth their best effort to accomplish the mission. It should be noted that seizures were significantly less than in 2004 mainly due to a change in trend and patterns and low marine interdiction resources available to cover the requirements in the Threat Assessment.

³ *The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment*, September 2003, DEA-03014, page 30
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

Core TABLE 7

Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) Table 7: Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year							
Year	Budget	Baseline Value of Drug Assets	Targeted Asset ROI	Value of Drug Assets Removed from Market			Actual Asset ROI
				Cash	Other Assets	Total	
2004	\$6,566,297	\$12,766,667	\$2	\$0	\$31,405,505	\$31,405,505	\$5
2005	\$7,238,972	\$12,766,667	\$3	\$10,300,501	\$2,531,228	\$12,831,729	\$2

SOURCES: PR/USVI HIDTA Performance Management Process (PMP) Database Calendar Year 2005.

REMARKS: The seizure of more than \$12.8 million in drug assets during CY2005 significantly reduced the availability of resources at the disposal of DTOs and MLOs. These seized investments in real property, including luxury homes, vehicles and boats, businesses, not only served to hurt DTO's king-pin players, but also is a clear message to others on the consequences of criminal lifestyles. This is an ROI of \$2 for every \$1.00 of funding invested. Law enforcement agencies provide additional dollars that cover officers' salaries, administrative overhead and related expenses not included in Table Seven.

Core Table 8

Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) Table 8: Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives by Year					
Year	Budget	Drugs and Assets Baseline	Targeted Total ROI	Drugs and Assets Removed from Market	Actual Total ROI
2004	\$6,566,297	\$132,766,667	\$20	\$315,892,745	\$48
2005	\$7,238,972	\$132,766,667	\$26	\$170,212,714	\$24

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, PMP Database & Matrix. "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2006 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2006-L0424-005. Please cite all sources used.

***NOTE:** Law Enforcement includes prosecution, intelligence, and enforcement initiatives. The budget column should be the same in tables 6-8.

REMARKS: Major disruptions occur in DTO operations when large amounts of drugs are seized by law enforcement. The larger the seizure of drugs, the bigger the impact achieved over the potential profits of the DTOs. A review of tables 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate the efficiency in the PR/USVI HIDTA in achieving its goal of diminishing illegal drugs, profits and assets on DTOs hands. Tables 6 - 7 show the results achieved, through an investment

of 7.2 million which resulted in the permanently removal of \$157 million in illicit drugs and \$12.8 million in drug profits from the marketplace. This is a remarkable figure and reflects very good rate of return on investment (ROI) as evidenced by the \$24 derived from each HIDTA dollar expended in law enforcement investigative, interdiction and intelligence initiatives. This ROI compares favorably to a profitable private sector business.

Core Table 9

Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes by Year at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) HIDTA				
Year	Investigations Baseline	Investigations Projected	Investigations Handled	% Handled
2004	0	0	0	0%
2005	0	16	50	312%

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005.

REMARKS: This table was not completed for CY 2004 as there was no such initiative in the PR/USVI HIDTA. However, prosecution support of cases should be mentioned. In PR and the USVI, the USAO regularly attends the monthly task force commanders meetings and provides support and guidance to expedite investigative and interdiction efforts with case development, evidence collection and organization, pre-trial preparation, asset seizures and case presentation.

Core Table 10

Table 10: Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories Dismantled by Size for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands)			
Meth Cost Per Ounce		\$0.00	
Lab Size	ID/Targeted	Dismantled	Value of Labs Dismantled
A. Less than 2 Oz	0	0	\$0.00
B. 2 - 8 Oz	0	0	\$0.00
C. 9 - 31 Oz	0	0	\$0.00
D. 32 - 159 Oz	0	0	\$0.00
E. 10 - 20 Lbs	0	0	\$0.00
F. Over 20 Lbs	0	0	\$0.00
Total	0	0	\$0.00

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005.

REMARKS: This table was filled with zeros as there are no known cases of amphetamine trafficking organizations identified as drug problem in the PR/USVI HIDTA region.

Core TABLE 11

Table 11: HIDTA Clandestine Laboratory Activities for Year Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands), in 2004				
	Baseline	# Projected	# Identified	% Identified
Laboratory Dump Sites Seized	0	0	0	0%
Chemical/Glassware Equipment Seizures	0	0	0	0%
Children Affected	0	0	0	0%

SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05.

***NOTE:** Transactions refers to both identified sellers and purchasers. Calculations will be automatically completed as data is entered.

REMARKS: This table was not completed as clandestine laboratories (CLANLAB) are not known to operate in the PR/USVI HIDTA region.

B. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 2

Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives

Core TABLE 12

Table 12: HIDTA Training Efficiency by Type of Training for Year 2005, at Puerto Rico (US Virgin Islands) (HIDTA Training Initiative only)												
Type of Training	# Students Expected for Training		# Students Actually Trained		# Training Hours Actually Provided		Total Training Cost		Training Cost Per Hour			
	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	% Change 2004-2005	
Analytical/Computer	120	120	120	30	111	540	\$18,350	\$5,000	\$165.32	\$9.26	-94%	
Investigative/Interdiction	870	870	870	1,583	752	18,969	\$323,934	\$29,500	\$430.76	\$1.56	-100%	
Management/Administrative	30	20	20	52	41	416	\$1,845	\$430	\$45.00	\$1.03	-98%	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	\$0	\$0	0	0	0%	
Total	1,020	1,010	1,010	1,665	904	19,925	\$344,129	\$34,930	\$380.67	\$1.75	-100%	

SOURCE: HIDTA On-Line Training Tracking System (HOTT), HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005.

REMARKS: Training is pivotal to improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of law enforcement personnel and their operations. In training was provided to 1,665 students for a total of 19,925 classrooms hours. This training was provided almost free of charge to assigned personnel and participating agency staff. These training courses would not have been provided/available without PR/USVI HIDTA support and funding. With a cost of \$1.75 per training hour our training strategy is becoming a success.

During CY 2005, the Training Initiative was operated by one part-time coordinator. Training funds for travel were allocated to the operational task forces at a modest rate. This occurred primarily due to the development of a more cost-effective approach to training that would focus on securing/coordinating free or reduced costs trainings. The goal was to focus training strictly on Task Force Officers (TFOs) assigned to HIDTA Initiatives and thus reduce the reliance on the limited HIDTA funds for the trainings and free them for use in vital operational areas.

Core TABLE 13

HIDTA PR/USVI Deconfliction Services, 2005				
Year	Total HIDTA Initiatives	# Initiatives Targeted to Use Services	# Initiatives Using	% Initiatives Using
2004	15	12	12	100%
2005	14	12	12	100%
2006				
2007				

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB

Core TABLE 14

PR/USVI HIDTA Deconfliction Submissions by Year						
Year	Baseline # Deconflictions Submitted	# Deconfliction Submissions Targeted	# Event Deconflictions Submitted	# Case/Subject Deconflictions Submitted	Total Deconflictions Submitted	% Deconflictions Submitted
2004	5,118	4,050	1,007	4,111	5,118	126%
2005	4,111	4,019	588	3,431	4,019	100%
2006					0	
2007					0	

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB.

REMARKS: A major law enforcement concern has been the paramount need to devise ways in which officer safety will not be placed in jeopardy. A critical aspect is the need for an effective deconfliction center that can ensure that law enforcement agents are not simultaneously conducting conflicting operations in the same place and time because of lack of communications, this causing injuries or death from “friendly fire.” Therefore, one of the core reasons for each HIDTA to have an ISC is to have a site that can serve as a

coordinating body to prevent the potential conflicts/encounters that may result in injury or death to law enforcement personnel.

Of the 12 initiatives eligible to use the deconfliction services, 100% took advantage of this valuable tool. This service promotes officer safety, helps to coordinate the investigative aspect of their work and serves to ensure resources conservation.

Core TABLE 15

PR/USVI HIDTA Investigations Supported by Year				
Year	Baseline # Investigations Receiving Analytical Support	# Investigations Targeted for Analytical Support	# Investigations Provided Analytical Support	% Targeted Investigations Supported
2004	105	133	92	69%
2005	105	123	94	76%
2006				
2007				

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB.

NOTE: Analytical support refers to toll, title III, document analysis, and/or complete analysis including prosecution stage

REMARKS: Law enforcement initiatives, while aggressively pursuing incarceration of the DTO leaders and dismantlement their operations, require support from those trained in intelligence analysis. In an environment where every dollar counts, intelligence driven investigations is of paramount importance and the desired mode of operation. The goal is to have every investigation supported by the ISC with analytical processes to maximize the success of each investigation. ISC support is rendered based on initiative requests. Table 15 depicts that 94 analytical support requests were handled by the ISC in support of 123 investigations targeted, or 76% of the organizations under investigation.

Core TABLE 16

PR/USVI HIDTA Affiliated Cases Referred by Year						
Year	Total HIDTA Initiative Cases	# Initiative Cases Targeted for Referral	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HIDTAs	# HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other Agencies	Total Initiative Cases Referred	% Targeted Initiative Cases Referred
2004	133	7	4	2	6	86%
2005	123	6	2	2	4	66%
2006					0	
2007					0	

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB.

REMARKS: Table 16 depicts the positive outcomes achieved in the area of Case Referrals. These activities are essential to achieve the goals of improving efficiency and

effectiveness through information sharing and coordinated intelligence. A review of the data will show that performance far exceeded the anticipated number of requests. Additionally, the ISC was able to respond positively to all such requests. Finally, the investigators and analysts referred four investigations, two to other HIDTAs and two to other agencies for further investigations.

Threat Specific TABLE 17A

PR/USVI HIDTA Firearms Removed from the Marketplace, 2005		
Firearms Seized (type.)	Amount Seized (ea.)	Wholesale Value
Rifles	19	\$32,000
Shotguns	5	\$4,500
Pistols	356	\$154,000
Revolvers	7	\$2,600
Firearms Traced		
Total Value	387	\$203,100

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB

REMARKS: Table 17A presents specific information on firearms removed from the marketplace with a DTO nexus. Reducing the availability of automatic and illegal firearms in the drug trafficking groups is crucial, as it contributes to the lowering of violent crime rates, particularly that of murder and against the safety of law enforcement officers.

Threat Specific TABLE 18

PR/USVI HIDTA Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended by Year					
Year	# Identified	# Targeted	% Targeted of Identified	# Apprehended	Apprehended % of Targeted
2004	530	370	70%	309	84%
2005	1,120	1,120	100%	1,099	98%
2006					
2007					

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing Presentation before the EB

REMARKS: Table 18 highlights a 98% success rate of the apprehension of fugitives that have a drug felony HIDTA nexus. Communities within PR and USVI are made safer by their apprehension of targeted fugitives.

VII. Other Achievements

In 2005, PR/USVI HIDTA initiated a thorough transformation process to address the latest threat challenges, budgetary constraints, and the technology developments, now available

to the law enforcement community. This transformation will continue the revamping of the HIDTA structure and its way of doing business in this region. This HIDTA is in a unique location and situation representing the third frontier of the U.S. main effort against the drug trafficking establishment and as such the initiatives have been refocused. Additionally three initiatives initiated relocation to improved sites: Money Laundering, Ponce and Fajardo Major Organization Investigations initiatives. HIDTA operations greatly contributed to the overall regional reduction of 479 crime against people and 5,286 crime against property as compared to CY-2004.

VIII. Conclusions

The two jurisdictions of PR and the USVI, located at a mid-point juncture between the CONUS and the source countries can be summarized as follows:

- Continues to be attractive as a key avenue of approach for illicit drugs in transit to the CONUS market;
- Major drugs trafficked remain cocaine, crack cocaine and heroin, and on a lesser scale marijuana;
- There is a recent trend to include some European MDMA; and
- Marijuana, mainly from Jamaica, Mexico and Northern California, is the most widely abused drug among adolescents and young adults.

Cocaine traffickers are predominantly Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican. Dominican and Puerto Rican organizations are the primary wholesale and retail distributors of the drug. The region is heavily used for drug related money laundering, resulting in federal designation as a HIFCA.

The EB's strong leadership and commitment to success have played a decisive role in achieving performance measures during the reporting period. The EB's leadership strategy was to establish specific goals and objectives in support of the National Strategy and that guided and focused the investigative efforts of the Initiatives and enhanced their productivity.

The EB has focused on reduction of drug availability by eliminating /disrupting DTOs through the use of intelligence driven investigations, reducing the harmful consequences of drug trafficking by addressing public corruption and violence in the community and, finally, improving efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts within HIDTA implementing a strong training program and dedicating resources to the curtailment of money laundering.

This is our second year of an effort to measure initiatives performance working within and toward the established goals and objectives, commenced using the PMP measures. The PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to highlight its remarkable achievements in 2005 toward the reduction of DTOs and MLOs, particularly those that are international in nature. The PR/USVI HIDTA continues to annually achieve remarkable results and such are achieved not only in measurable form, but in an efficient and effective manner.

The average cost per investigation, including arrests, has been computed at \$190.499. An insignificant amount expended when measured against the well being of the communities served and the lives that were saved because of disrupting or dismantling these DTOs. Of particular importance was the total return on the investment noted to be \$19 for 2005, while the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at \$127 million, or a ROI of \$17 for every dollar invested. This high performance occurred despite the restrictions imposed by austere budgetary times.

To close, the successes of the PR/USVI HIDTA are measurable, tangible and exceeded expectations. Focus will continue to be in maritime interdiction based on hard intelligence, investigations of DTOs/MLOs, money laundering and the use of intelligence driven investigations.

Our motto, *“COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE”*, is one that guides our efforts. We are proud of our achievements and since our inception have won four National ONDCP awards for outstanding performance, including the one for “Outstanding HIDTA of the Year”. *This has occurred solely because of the tremendous successes we have experienced against drug traffickers that just would not have occurred if HIDTA did not exist.*


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- A. Organizational Chart of the HIDTA.
- B. Table listing composition of Executive Board with local, state and federal affiliation.
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APPENDIX A



LEGEND:

MOI: Major Organization Investigations
FURA: Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion (PR Police Department Air and Marine Law Enforcement)

	Investigative
	Interdiction
	Support
	Intelligence

APPENDIX B

<u>EXECUTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS</u>	
Chairperson ELTON LEWIS Commissioner U.S. Virgin Islands Police Department	
Vice Chairperson LUIS FRATICELLI Special Agent in Charge Federal Bureau of Investigations	
MEMBERS	
<u>Non-Federal</u>	<u>Federal</u>
BG FRANCISCO A. MARQUEZ The Adjutant General PR National Guard	HUMBERTO GARCIA, ESQ. United States Attorney District of PR
ALVA SWAN, ESQ. (Deceased) Attorney General VI Department of Justice	ANTHONY JENKINS, ESQ. United States Attorney District of the Virgin Islands
LYDIA St JOHNS Special Agent in Charge (<i>Actg.</i>) Immigration and Customs Enforcement	JOSE LOZADA MEDINA Director Special Investigations Bureau - PR
JUAN A. FLORES GALARZA, CPA Secretary PR Department of Treasury (Hacienda)	JEROME HARRIS Special Agent in Charge Drug Enforcement Administration Caribbean Division
PEDRO A. TOLEDO DÁVILA Superintendent PR Police Department	BRIAN WIMPLING Special Agent in Charge Internal Revenue Service
MIGUEL PEREIRA, ESQ. Secretary PR Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation	MARCIAL O. FELIX Resident Agent in Charge Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
BG EDDY L. CHARLES The Adjutant General U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard	CAPTAIN JAMES E. TUNSTALL Commanding Officer U.S. Coast Guard 7 th District
LT. EDWIN ROSADO ACEVEDO Commissioner Bayamon Municipal Police	MARCELINO BORGES Director, Field Operations Customs & Border Protection
WILLIAM VAZQUEZ, ESQ. Secretary of Justice PR Department of Justice	HERMAN J. WIRSHING United States Marshal U.S. Marshal Service

APPENDIX C**Participating Agencies (Personnel) and Organization CY 2005**

Federal	Full-time	Part-time	Total
• Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms	10		10
• Federal Bureau of Investigation	24	1	25
• Drug Enforcement Administration	39	5	44
• Immigration & Customs Enforcement	26	2	28
• U. S. Postal Inspection Services	1	1	2
• U.S. Marshal Service	10		10
• U.S. Coast Guard	24		24
• U.S. Coast Guard Investigation Services	10		10
• Bureau of Prisons	1		1
• Internal Revenue Service/CID	7		7
Non-Federal	Full-time	Part-time	Total
• PR Police Department	82		82
• FURA (Forces United for Rapid Action - PRPD) ⁴	547		547
• USVI Police Department	14		14
• PR National Guard	14		14
• Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation - PR	4		4
• U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard	4		4
• Department of Hacienda (IRS-PR)	6		6
• Special Investigation Bureau (NIE)	25		25
• Municipal Police & Contractors	25		25
	875	9	884

⁴ P.R. Air and Marine Unit
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APPENDIX E

STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005. EB streamlined the number of Task Forces to synchronize operations in accordance with the developed goals and objectives. The HIDTA was reduced to 14 initiatives as indicated below:

Initiative	Type	Lead Agency	Mission
Investigative Support Center	Intelligence	FBI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative and strategic drug intelligence • Enables a more effective and efficient utilization of drug investigative resources • Develops strategic intelligence • Ensures subject and case deconfliction
Air and Marine Interdiction Program (FURA)	Interdiction	PRPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground, air and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to 12 miles deep within the coastline of PR.
Blue Lightning Strike Force	Interdiction	VIPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to three miles deep within the coastline of USVI.
High Seas Narcotics Trafficking Operations	Interdiction	USCG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targets drug and migrant trafficking organizations through 24 hour interdictions at sea. • Disrupts transit and arrival zones outside territorial waters specifically in the PR/USVI area of responsibility • Assists other agencies in the regional marine intelligence trafficking, interdicting illegal drugs smuggling organizations.
Fajardo Major Organization Investigations	Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the East coast of PR to include offshore municipalities of Vieques and Culebra islands
Money Laundering Initiative	Investigative	ICE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts regional complex investigations and interdiction of sophisticated drug MLOs to prevent the exporting of illegally obtained proceeds to international bank accounts
Ponce Major Organization Investigations	Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the southwest region of PR.
Safe Neighborhoods	Investigative	ATF & NIE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies, targets, investigates and prosecutes DTOs operating in PR and the USVI. • Targets violent narco-trafficking organizations responsible for drug related violent crime in PR and the USVI.

STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005. EB streamlined the number of Task Forces to synchronize operations in accordance with the developed goals and objectives. The HIDTA was reduced to 14 initiatives as indicated below:

Initiative	Type	Lead Agency	Mission
San Juan Major Organization Investigations	Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantle sophisticated DTOs operating in the northwestern region of PR.
PR Fugitives Task Force	Investigative	USMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disrupts narcotics smuggling, distribution, money laundering and street gang drug related activities throughout PR, by identifying, locating and apprehending HIDTA related fugitives within PR and CONUS.
St. Croix Major Organization Investigation	Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Croix, USVI.
St. Thomas Major Organization Investigations	Investigative	DEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts long range complex investigations • Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Thomas, USVI.
HIDTA Training Initiative	Support	PRPD & HIDTA Mgt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhances the quality of drug related investigations • Improves the performance and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies • Increases the safety of law enforcement officers in PR and USVI.
Management and Coordination Support	Support	HIDTA Mgt.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management and organizational guidance • Finance, logistics, operations and administrative support • Coordinating of translation services and training to all initiatives in PR and USVI. Islands.

2. ICE Threat Assessment CY2004